The doctrine of plausible view and impermissibility of substituting alternative contractual views

provides that courts reviewing an arbitral award cannot disrupt findings of fact or contractual interpretations if the view taken by the arbitral tribunal is plausible. The mere existence or possibility of an alternative view on the facts or on the construction of the contract does not entitle a reviewing court under Section 34, or an appellate court under Section 37, to reverse the conclusions of the arbitral tribunal. An award cannot be disturbed solely because the appellate court believes that an alternative interpretation represents a better, more preferable, or more elegant view of the contractual provisions. So long as the view adopted by the arbitrator is a possible and reasonable one based on the record, judicial restraint dictates that such view must be accepted, and interference is warranted only where the interpretation is so perverse or arbitrary that no reasonable person could have possibly arrived at it. (Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tuticorin Port Trust | 2026 INSC 34)