standard of appellate interference in appeals against acquittal

The appellate court possesses full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the entire evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded, as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes no limitation, restriction, or condition on the exercise of such power. However, while exercising this jurisdiction, the appellate court must constantly bear in mind that an order of acquittal reinforces the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused—firstly, the fundamental presumption that every person is innocent until proven guilty, and secondly, the reinforcement of that innocence by the trial court's order. Interference with a judgment of acquittal is permissible only when the findings suffer from patent perversity, are based on a material misreading or omission of evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible and the only conclusion consistent with the evidence on record is the guilt of the accused proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Expressive phraseologies like "substantial and compelling reasons" or "distorted conclusions" reflect the appellate court's traditional reluctance to disturb acquittals rather than a limitation on its jurisdiction. Ultimately, unless the trial court's view is clearly unreasonable, perverse, or legally unsustainable, the appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion merely because an alternative plausible view exists. (Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka & Ors. | 2026 INSC 67)