Primacy of the literal rule of statutory interpretation

The foundational rule of statutory interpretation dictates that where the language of a legislative provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, courts must give the words their natural and literal meaning. Judges are bound to take the words as expressed by the legislature without adding, amending, or supplying perceived omissions through judicial construction. Departing from the literal rule when statutory language is absolute leads to unpredictable outcomes, destroys judicial discipline, and encroaches upon the exclusive legislative domain of Parliament. The legislature is presumed to say what it means and mean what it says in the text of the statute. Even if a literal construction leads to hardship or inconvenience, courts cannot rewrite statutory text under the guise of searching for an unexpressed legislative intent. Re-writing a statutory provision by reading the term "widow of a predeceased son" in place of "any widow of a son" would violate core canons of interpretation. Therefore, courts must strictly adhere to the plain text of Section 21(vii) and refrain from adding unstated qualifications to the statutory language. (Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma & Ors. | 2026 INSC 54)